This paper considers the scenario that multiple data owners wish to apply a machine learning method over the combined dataset of all owners to obtain the best possible learning output but do not want to share the local datasets owing to privacy concerns. We design systems for the scenario that the stochastic gradient descent (SGD) algorithm is used as the machine learning method because SGD (or its variants) is at the heart of recent deep learning techniques over neural networks. Our systems differ from existing systems in the following features: (1) any activation function can be used, meaning that no privacy-preserving-friendly approximation is required;
Introduction

Background
Stochastic gradient descent (SGD) and its variants are important methods in machine learning. In recent years, these methods have become vital tools in deep learning based on neural networks, producing surprisingly high learning accuracy.
While crucial for SGD and machine learning in general, accumulating a massive collection of data in one central location is not easy for several reasons including the issue of data privacy. In such cases, it is more desirable to keep the data in its original location while making use of it.
In this paper we assume that there are L distributed datasets owned by L trainers. Each trainer aims to apply SGD to all L datasets to maximize the learning accuracy; while not wishing to share its own dataset to minimize the risk of data leakage.
Activation functions inside neural networks are crucial for making the networks learn effectively. Depending on the specific dataset, one activation function may empirically work better than others. Therefore, it is important to be able to choose the activation function when training neural networks. Ideally, when designing protocols for privacy-preserving SGD and its variants, there is no restriction such as privacy-preserving friendliness imposed on activation functions.
Placing no restrictions on activation functions, Shokri and Shmatikov [2] presented a system for privacy-preserving asynchronous SGD in which an honest-but-curious server is employed to hold the gradients computed by SGD using local data. The system of Shokri and Shmatikov is Table 1 . Privacy-preserving distributed deep learning allowing any activation function.
Paper
Use of cryptography Activation Security against Security against function curious server collusion [2] Transport Layer Security (TLS) Any No No [4] Additively homomorphic encryption & TLS Any Yes No This paper Transport Layer Security (TLS) Any Yes Yes designed to share only a part of local gradients with the server, and their experiments show that it is sufficient to obtain high accuracy for real datasets such as the MNIST dataset containing images of handwritten digits [3] . Shokri and Shmatikov [2] did not use cryptographic tools such as secret sharing or homomorphic encryption in their system. As the minimum to protect the communication between trainers and the server, standard Transport Layer Security (TLS) is used. As a result, they wrote: "Our system achieves this [privacy goal] at a much lower performance cost than cryptographic techniques such as secure multi-party computation or homomorphic encryption and is suitable for deployment in modern large-scale deep learning." We follow their footsteps, aiming to use only TLS when designing our privacy-preserving systems, as shown in Table 1 .
Our contributions
We propose two novel systems for privacy-preserving SGD to protect the local data of all trainers. Similar to the system in [2] and its enhanced variant [4] , our systems can handle any activation function. However, very different from the systems in [2, 4] , in our systems the trainers do not share gradients but share the weights of the neural network. Our systems are called the SNT system and FNT system, depending on the connection with Server-aided Network Topology (SNT) or Fullyconnected Network Topology (FNT) among the trainers. The SNT and FNT systems are described in Section 4, and have the following properties of security and accuracy. In addition, a comparison with the systems in [2, 4] is given in Table 1 .
• Security against a curious server (in SNT). Our SNT system leaks no information on both the trained weight parameters and the data of participants to an honest-but-curious server. See Theorem 1.
• Security against extreme collusion (both SNT and FNT). Even in the extreme case that only one trainer (wlog., called trainer 1) is honest, and the other trainers and the server are curious, it is difficult to recover the local data of honest trainer 1. See Theorems 2 and 4.
As a special case, this property also ensures that a possibly curious trainer cannot recover the data of the others. In addition, it is easy to combine results [5] on differentially private SGD with our systems as noted in Section 4.3, so that local data items can be protected in the sense of differential privacy.
• Accuracy (both SNT and FNT). Our systems achieve identical accuracy to SGD trained over the joint dataset of all participants. See Theorems 3 and 5.
Experiments with UCI datasets and MNIST dataset. We conduct a number of experiments using benchmark datasets. Specifically, using UCI datasets, we show that the accuracy of our systems outperforms the previously reported results in [6] for the task of privacy-preserving classification. Furthermore, using a multilayer perceptron (MLP) and a convolutional neural network (CNN) over the MNIST dataset of 50,000 images of handwritten digits, the running time of our system is less than three times that of the original SGD while maintaining learning accuracies. See Section 5.
Technical overview
Stochastic gradient descent (SGD), no privacy protection. In SGD, the weight parameters (flattened to a vector) W for the neural network are initialized randomly. At each iteration, gradient G is computed by using a data item and the current W , and then the weight vector is updated as follows:
where α is a scalar called the learning rate. The updating process is repeated until a desired minimum for a predefined cost function based on cross-entropy or squared error is reached.
Shokri-Shmatikov systems.
In the system of [2] [Sect. 5] with one central server and many distributed trainers, the server stores a weight vector W server . The update rule in (1) is modified as follows:
in which vector G selective local contains a selected (say 1% ∼ 10%) part of the locally computed gradients. The update using (2) allows each participant to choose which gradients to share globally with the hope of reducing the risk of leaking sensitive information on the participant's local dataset to the curious server. However, as shown in [4] , such selected gradients may result in leaking information on the local data.
In [2] [Sect. 7], Shokri and Shmatikov showed an additional technique of using differential privacy as a countermeasure against indirect leakage from gradients. Their strategy was to add Laplace noises to G selective local at (2). However, because secrecy and differential privacy are orthogonal, still there is potential for leakage.
To solve the problem of data leakage from gradients, Phong et al. [4] proposed that one can use additively homomorphic encryption to protect gradients from the curious server. However, even with homomorphic encryption, the system in [4] is still weak against the collusion of a curious server and some curious trainers. Indeed, from (2), if the colluding parties know the current and previous weight parameters, then they can compute the selective gradients of other (honest) trainers.
Our systems. Our approach is very different from those of [2, 4] , because trainers do not share the gradients (either plain or encrypted) but instead share the weights. In our SNT system in Section 4, we make use of the following weight update process: each trainer i takes the current W server from the server and initially sets its weight vector as
then the trainer repeatedly performs the local training for W (i) using its local dataset via SGD,
and uploads W (i) to the server to replace W server , namely
The trained weights may be proprietary and should be kept secret from those who are not trainers (e.g., the server in our setting). To this end, the trainers will use a shared symmetric key (kept secret from the server) to encrypt W (i) and W server using (3) and (5) . The local update in (4) by each trainer can be performed as is after decryption because the trainer holds the decryption key. Thus, the curious server will only handle ciphertexts without knowing the secret key and hence it will obtain no information on the datasets. The process in (3), (4), and (5) can be succinctly described as the process of updating the weight vector W server using the data of trainer i. If all trainers repeat the process, then W server is trained over the combined datasets of all trainers as desired. This final W server is known to all trainers owing to the shared symmetric key. Because of the repeated application of (4), sharing weights is intuitively equivalent to sharing a weighted sum of all gradients. Therefore, from a privacy-preserving perspective, shared weights are more robust against information leakage. Indeed, we prove in Theorems 2 and 4 that inverting local data from the weights can be seen as the problem of solving a system of nonlinear equations, where the number of equations is smaller than the number of variables (data items).
Difference with the conference version
An abridged version of this paper was in [1] . This version improves [1] in the following ways: (1) we add the FNT system and compare with the SNT system; (2) we state and prove that our systems are relatively robust against the extreme collusion of trainers in Theorems 2 and 4; (3) we consider various extensions for our systems, including the use of differential privacy; (4) we add the experiments on UCI datasets, showing that the accuracies of our systems are better than those of [6, 7] regarding the task of classification.
Other related works
Abadi et al. [5] examined differentially private SGD regarding how much information is leaked from the trained weight parameters, which is a problem orthogonal but complementary to this work.
Gilad-Bachrach et al. [8] presented a system called CryptoNets, which allows homomorphically encrypted data to be feed forward to an already-trained neural network. Because CryptoNets assumes that the weights in the neural network have been trained beforehand, the system aims to make predictions for individual data items. The goals of our paper and [2, 4] differ from that of [8] , as our systems and that of Shokri and Shmatikov exactly aim to train the weights utilizing multiple data sources, while CryptoNets [8] does not. In the same vein of research, the works [9] [10] [11] [12] examined secure neural network prediction.
Hitaj et al. [13] , employing generative adversarial networks, showed that sharing gradients are dangerous in collaborative learning, thus emphasizing the observation in [4] . Chang et al. [14] also independently proposed a system similar to our FNT system, without any security analysis.
Aono et al. [6, 7] used a polynomial approximation for logistic regression so that they could design a privacy-preserving system for classification tasks. Owing to the polynomial approximation, the classification accuracy was inferior to that of the original logistic regression especially when the data dimension increased. Hesamifard et al. [15] used polynomial approximation for continuous activation functions.
Using a two-server model, Mohassel and Zhang [16] proposed protocols for privacy-preserving linear regression, logistic regression, and an MLP in which secure-computation-friendly activation functions were employed. For example, they used an approximation for the logistic function. There were no experimental results on CNNs reported in [16] perhaps owing to the hurdles of implementing the Fast Fourier Transform in the case of secure computation. Subsequently, Mohassel and Rindal also considered a three-server model in [17] .
Using secret sharing, Bonawitz et al. [18] proposed a secure aggregation method and applied it to deep neural networks to aggregate user-provided model updates. In [18] the trained weight parameters appear in plaintext on a central server, while in our systems this is not necessarily the case. The communication cost in our systems is O(1) (namely, independent of the number of trainers) per weight update, while it is O(N trainer ) in [18] , where N trainer is the number of trainers.
Transfer learning is a method in machine learning where a pretrained weight parameter of a neural network over a dataset is reused in another neural network over a different dataset. For example, a pretrained weight parameter for classifying cars can be loaded into a related but different neural network for the task of classifying buses. The reasoning in this example is that the pretrained weight parameters have been optimized to "understand" the components of cars, so should be useful for learning and classifying buses. Our systems share the principle of reusing weight parameters in transfer learning, but have the difference that all the neural networks of the trainers are identical for the same task.
Preliminaries
We recall a few preliminaries on cryptography and machine learning in this section.
Symmetric encryption. Symmetric encryption schemes consist of the following (possibly probabilistic) poly-time algorithms: KeyGen(1 λ ) takes a security parameter λ and generates the secret key K; Enc(K, m), equivalently written as Enc K (m), produces c which is the ciphertext of message m; Dec(K, c) returns message m encrypted in c.
Ciphertext indistinguishability against chosen plaintext attacks [19] (or CPA security for short) ensures that no information is leaked from ciphertexts. We will use symmetric encryption as provided by TLS.
Neural networks. Figure 1 shows a neural network with 5 inputs, 2 hidden layers, and 2 outputs. The node with +1 represents the bias term. The neuron (including the bias 1 ) nodes are connected via weight variables W . In a deep-learning structure of a neural network, there can be multiple layers each with thousands of neurons. Each neuron node (except the bias node) is associated with 
The nonlinearity of these activation functions is important for the network to learn complicated data distributions.
The learning task is, given a training dataset, to determine these weight variables to minimize a predefined cost function such as the cross-entropy or the squared error cost function [20] . The cost function defined over one data item data = (x, y) with input x and truth value y will be written as J(W, x, y) in which W is the weight parameters.
Stochastic gradient descent (SGD) (see also [20] ). Let W be the weight parameters and let G ← δJ(W,x,y) δW be the corresponding gradients of the cost function J(W, x, y) with respect to the variables in W . The variable update rule in SGD is as follows for a learning rate α(t) ∈ R at time t:
The learning rate α(t) can be a constant or can be changed adaptively.
To make SGD work more efficiently, a typical technique is to use vectorization via a minibatch of data instead of a single data item. Namely, multiple data items (e.g., 256) are packed correspondingly into matrices (X, Y ) and then the following processes are carried out:
where α(t) is the learning rate at time t. 
Our proposed systems: privacy-preserving SGD via weight sharing
We propose two systems for privacy-preseving SGD: one with a Server-aided Network Topology (SNT) and the other with Fully-connected Network Topology (FNT) in which each connection is via a separate TLS/SSL channel. The SNT system makes use of an honest-but-curious server (e.g., cloud server) while the FNT system does not. One trade-off is given in 
Our Server-aided Network Topology (SNT) system
The system is depicted in Figure 2 . There is one common server and multiple distributed trainers. The server is assumed to be honest-but-curious: it is honest in its operation but curious regarding data. Each trainer is connected with the server via a separate communication channel such as a TLS/SSL channel. The symmetric key K is shared between trainers and is kept secret to the server. Notationally, Enc K (·) is a symmetric encryption with key K, which protects the weight vector against the curious server. The training data of the trainers is used only locally, while the encrypted weight vector Enc K (W ) is sent back and forth between the server and the trainers. The weight vector W needs to be initialized once, which can be carried out by one of the trainers by simply initializing W randomly and sending Enc K (W ) to the server. Each client stores the updated weight vector W at each round, then uses a testing dataset to locally check whether or not W can achieve good accuracy. Finally, the best W can be shared among the trainers via a separate communication channel if required.
The following theorems establish the properties for the security and accuracy of our systems.
Theorem 1 (Security against the curious server, SNT system). In our system in Figure  2 , the curious server learns no information on the local datasets of the trainer.
Proof. The curious server passively handles ciphertexts of a symmetric encryption scheme. Therefore, it obtains no information from the ciphertexts if the symmetric encryption scheme has security against chosen plaintext attacks.
Theorem 2 (Security against extreme collusion, SNT system). In our system in Figure 2 , suppose that only Trainer 1 is honest and the others (Server and Trainers 2, . . . , L) are malicious. Even with such collusion, the colluding others cannot recover any data item of honest Trainer 1 unless they solve a nonlinear equation (or a subset sum problem).
Proof. Referring to Figure 2(b) , what the colluding parties (namely, Server and Trainers 2, . . . , L) obtain from Trainer 1 is the initial weight and output weight. These weights are linked via a number of gradient descent update steps. Concretely, let the initial weight be W 0 = W (init) , the final weight be W n = W (f inal) , and (X i , Y i ) (1 ≤ i ≤ n) be the randomly shuffled mini-batches from Dataset 1 from the current epoch. Then, the gradient descent update steps are as follows:
in which the scalar α i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) can be equal or different depending on the learning rate schedule of Trainer 1. Reversely,
In short, even though the colluding parties know W (f inal) and W (init) , they can only compute the weighted sum of gradients
in which n = |Dataset 1 |/batch size 1 in our expected applications. In (9) , the local dataset and hence each gradient G i is kept secret, and even α i may vary secretly depending on the learning rate schedule of Trainer 1. Recovering any data item of Dataset 1 from equation (9) is the problem of solving non-linear equation stated in the theorem statement.
As seen from (8), releasing neural network weight parameters can be seen as publishing a weighted sum of gradients and the initial weight. Therefore, computing any data item given the weight parameters is also a subset sum problem.
Remark: data inversion given weights and subset sum problem. While inverting data from weight parameters is considered hard implicitly in the literature, to our knowledge, this is the first time such a relation between data secrecy (given weight parameters) and a subset sum problem has been made explicit as in Theorem 2.
Theorem 3 (Accuracy of the SNT system). Our system in Figure 2 functions as running SGD on the combined dataset of all local datasets. Proof. Our system in Figure 2 (when removing all encryption and decryption) functions as the left pseudocode in Figure 3 . In addition, the right pseudocode is the equivalent version via setting In the right pseudocode, the loop (for ... endfor) is exactly one epoch of SGD, namely one pass over all data items in CombinedDataSet. Therefore, our system in Figure 2 functions as running SGD as described in Section 3 on the combined dataset CombinedDataSet of all trainers, completing the proof.
Our Fully-connected Network Topology (FNT) system
The system is depicted in Figure 4 . There is no central server; thus there is no need to use symmetric encryption to encrypt the weights as in Figure 2 , but the trainers still need secure channels such as TLS to transfer the weights to each other. Because there is no central server, the trainers must agree the order of sending and receiving weight parameters in advance, for example, 1 → 2 → · · · → L → 1 → · · · . Each trainer receives a weight from the previous trainer, and updates that weight using mini-batches of data from its own dataset, then sends the updated weight to the next trainer. Chang et al. [14] also independently 2 proposed a system similar to our FNT system but without any security analysis.
Theorem 4 (Security against extreme collusion, FNT system). In our system in Figure 4 , suppose that only Trainer 1 is honest and the others (Trainers 2, . . . , L) are malicious. Even with such collusion, the (malicious) others cannot recover any data item of the honest Trainer 1 unless they solve a nonlinear equation (or a subset sum problem).
Proof. The proof is identical to that of Theorem 2.
Theorem 5 (Accuracy of the SNT system). Our system in Figure 4 functions as running SGD on the combined dataset of all local datasets.
Proof. The proof is identical to that of Theorem 3.
Additional considerations for our SNT and FNT systems
Below are some additional considerations for our systems, which can be employed depending on the specific application and its requirements. (9), the following equations are known to the colluding parties when assuming that only Trainer 1 is honest:
n are unknown gradients depending on the mini-batches of data. As the neural network contains nonlinear activation functions, the above can be seen as a system of nonlinear equations of unknown data items. Solving this system of equations is expected to be hard because typically n > k and the right-hand side of each equation is non-polynomial.
Local data augmentation. Deep learning is often referred to as a "data hunger", and it is not hard for a neural network to overfit a training dataset. To deal with the problem of overfitting and hence improve the learning accuracy, each trainer can freely employ any data augmentation technique in the local training process. For example, a data item such as an image can be rotated, sheared, or flipped (or even mixed up as in [21] ) so that the data volume is significantly increased.
Using other optimizers. Instead of SGD, the trainers in our SNT and FNT systems can use other optimizers such as RMSProp [22] or Adam [23] , because only the weights are sent from each trainer to the next, as in the FNT system, or to the server in the SNT system. In our experiments we use both SGD and Adam as optimizers.
Weight parameters with differential privacy. It is possible to make the shared weights differentially private, by adding Laplace noises to the local gradients as in [5] when updating the weight parameters at each trainer. Differential privacy will make the shared weights less dependent on any specific data item, thus making each local dataset more protected.
Experiments
Environment. For the UCI datasets, we employ a laptop and only run our programs on its CPU (Intel Core i7-2860QM, 2.5GHz). For the experiment with the MNIST dataset, we employ a machine with Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2660 v3 @ 2.60GHz with Cuda-8.0 and GPU Tesla K40m; with Python 2.7.12 distributed in Anaconda 4.2.0 (64-bit). We assume a 1 Gbps channel between the trainers and the server (in Figure 2 ) and between the trainers (in Figure 4) .
Symmetric encryption. For the SNT system, we use AES-128-CBC encryption in OpenSSL which satisfies security against chosen plaintext attacks (CPA). The secret symmetric key has 128 bits.
Experiments with UCI datasets
Using our systems (both SNT and FNT), we conduct experiments on UCI datasets, and the results for the accuracy and F-score are given in Table 3 . Our accuracy and F-score are better than the results reported in [6] . This is possibly due to the fact that our systems, while protecting data privacy, do not reduce the accuracy of the underlying learning algorithm (as proved in Theorems 3 and 5). Below are details of each dataset and its corresponding experiment. In the following neural networks, the activation function used in the hidden nodes is the rectified linear unit (ReLU) and the sigmoid function is used at the output nodes.
Pima (diabetes). We use a neural network with the following architecture: 8 (input) -512dropout (0.6) -64 -dropout (0.4) -1 (output). Namely, the 8 features (as real numbers) from each data item are fed to the input layer, which is connected to 512 hidden neural nodes. Next, the 512 hidden nodes are connected to 64 hidden nodes with a dropout rate of 0.6, and so forth. This neural network consists of 37,505 trainable parameters. To ensure the replicability of results, we fix the random seed of Python as random.seed(12345), the numpy random seed as numpy.random.seed (15) , and the tensorflow seed as tensorflow.set random seed(1234). The original dataset is randomly split in a ratio of 8:2 for training and testing. Moreover, we envision the number of trainers to be L = 20 in our systems, so the training set is split into 20 parts, each held by a distributed trainer. The Adam optimizer is used with a fixed learning rate of 0.0002 and each trainer uses a batch size of 128 data items. Each distributed trainer runs 150 local epochs on its own data before passing its encrypted weights to the server (or the next trainer). The number of central epochs is 20, meaning that each trainer uploads and downloads the encrypted weights 20 times from the server in SNT (or from the previous trainer in FNT). It takes less than 7 minutes for the system to finish its operations.
Breast Cancer. We use a neural network with the following architecture: 9 (input) -32 -dropout (0.1) -40 -dropout (0.2) -64 -dropout (0.4) -64 -dropout (0.4) -64 -dropout (0.4) -8 -4 -1 (output). This neural network consists of 14,785 trainable parameters. The random seeds are set as numpy.random.seed (15) , random.seed(12345), and tensorflow.set random seed(1234). The original dataset is randomly split into a training set of 391 records and a testing set of 292 records. The training set is further split randomly into 20 parts, each held by a distributed trainer. The Adam optimizer is used with a fixed learning rate of 0.0002 and each trainer uses a batch size of 128 data items. Each distributed trainer runs 40 local epochs on its own data before passing its encrypted weights to the server (or the next trainer). The number of central epochs is 5, meaning that each trainer uploads and downloads five times the encrypted weights from the server in SNT (or from the previous trainer in FNT). It takes less than 1 minute for the system to finish.
Banknote Authentication. We use a neural network with the following architecture: 4 (input) -128 -dropout (0.7) -64 -dropout (0.5) -64 -dropout (0.5) -1 (output). This neural network consists of 13,121 trainable parameters. The random seeds are set as numpy.random.seed (15) , random.seed(12345), and tensorflow.set random seed(1234). We split the dataset into two parts: a training set with 986 records and a testing set with 386 records. The training set is further split randomly into 20 parts, each held by a distributed trainer. The Adam optimizer is used with a fixed learning rate of 0.0002 and each trainer uses a batch size of 128 data items. Each distributed trainer runs 70 local epochs on its own data before passing its encrypted weight to the server (or the next trainer). The number of central epochs is 1, meaning that each trainer uploads and downloads 1 the encrypted weights once at the server in SNT (or from the previous trainer in FNT). It takes less than 11 seconds for the system to finish.
Adult Income. We use a neural network with the following architecture: 14 (input) -64 -dropout (0.4) -32 -dropout (0.2) -1 (output). This neural network consists of 3,073 trainable parameters. The random seeds are set as numpy.random.seed(4) and tensorflow.set random seed(1234). The training set is split randomly into 20 parts, each held by a distributed trainer. The Adam optimizer is used with a fixed learning rate of 0.0002 and each trainer uses a batch size of 128 data items. Each distributed trainer runs 14 local epochs on its own data before passing its encrypted weights to the server (or the next trainer). The number of central epochs is 120, meaning that each trainer uploads and downloads 120 times the encrypted weights from the server in SNT (or from the previous trainer in FNT). It takes around 100 minutes for the system to finish.
Skin/NonSkin. We use a neural network with the following architecture: 3 (input) -64 -dropout (0.4) -32 -dropout (0.2) -1 (output). This neural network consists of 2,369 trainable parameters. The random seeds are set as numpy.random.seed (15) , tensorflow.set random seed(1234), and random.seed(12345). The original dataset is randomly split in a ratio of 8:2 for training and testing. The training set is further split randomly into 20 parts, each held by a distributed trainer. The Adam optimizer is used with a fixed learning rate of 0.0002 and each trainer uses a batch size of 128 data items. Each distributed trainer runs 10 local epochs on its own data before passing its encrypted weight to the server (or the next trainer). The number of central epochs is 20, meaning each trainer uploads and downloads 20 times the encrypted weights from the server in SNT (or from the previous trainer in FNT). It takes less than 75 minutes for the system to finish.
Interlude: Credit Card Fraud Detection. The dataset is provided in [24] and consists of credit card transactions by European users over 2 days. There are 30 features in each transaction, including the time and amount of the transaction. We randomly split the original dataset (containing 492 fraud transactions) in a ratio of 8:2, so that the training set consists of 284,807 transactions and the testing set consists of 56,962 transactions. Each transaction is labeled by 0 (normal) or 1 (fraud). We envision the number of trainners to be L = 20 in our systems, so the training set is further split into 20 parts each consisting of approximately 14,241 transactions. Each trainer employs a neural network with the following architecture: 30 (input) -64 -dropout (0.4) -32dropout (0.2) -1. The Adam optimizer is used with a learning rate of 0.0002 and a batch size of 128. The seeds for randomness are set as numpy.random.seed (15) , random.seed(12345), and tensorflow.set random seed(1234). Each trainer uses 10 local epochs before sending the weights out. The number of central epochs is 30. The running time of the system is around 65 minutes. The testing accuracy is 99.96% with a corresponding F-score of 0.8.
Experiments with the MNIST dataset
Below are experiments using an MLP and a CNN performed with the MNIST dataset.
Dataset. We use the MNIST dataset [3] containing 28 × 28 images of hand written numbers. We assume five trainers, namely L = 5 in Figures 2 4, each of which holds 10,000 images from the MNIST dataset. The validation set contains 10,000 images and the test set contains 10,000 images. Because the training set of each trainer is insufficient in size (relative to the validation set and the test set), the trainers wish to learn from the combined training set with a a total of 5 · 10, 000 = 50, 000 images). The number of weight parameters is 431,080, which is the sum of 20 × 5 × 5 + 20 (first convolution layer), 50 × 20 × 5 × 5 + 50 (second convolution layer), 50 × 4 × 4 × 500 + 500 (fully connected), and 500 × 10 + 10. We use pickle to convert these weight parameters as Python objects into a byte stream for encryption, resulting in a plaintext with a size of around 4.73 MB. The corresponding ciphertext is also pickled, having a size of around 6.31 MB, which is sent via our 1 Gbps network in around 0.051 seconds. Below we give the approximate timings of trainers 1 ≤ i ≤ 5. Thus, 
Conclusion
We have conctructed privacy-preserving systems in which multiple machine-learning trainers can use SGD or its variants over the combined dataset of all trainers without having to share the local dataset of each trainer. Differing from previous works, our systems make use of the weight parameters rather than the gradient parameters. The experimental results show that our systems are practically efficient in terms of computation and communication and effective in terms of accuracy.
